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FORMALISM AND NONFORMALISM IN
CHOICE OF LAW METHODOLOGY
William C. Powers, Jr.*
In Baffin Land Corp. v. Monticello Motor Inn, Inc.,' the Wash-
ington Supreme Court rejected for contract cases2 the formal, rule-ori-
ented choice of law methodology of the first Restatement3 in favor of
the more flexible "significant contact" approach of the Restatement
(Second).4 In doing so, the court responded to criticism of formal
choice of law rules 5 and became part of a trend away from their use.6
In rejecting the formal lex loci rules, however, the court did not give a
clear indication of the methodology it will use in choice of law prob-
lems.7
This article presents an analysis of choice of law methodologies in
terms of their formal and nonformal characteristics. In Part I, formal
and nonformal decisionmaking processes are defined, and their bene-
fits and detriments are examined. In Part II, two concrete choice of
law problems-the New York experience with host-guest statutes and
the policy of validation in contractual and testamentary transactions,
-are studied to highlight the pitfalls of both formal and nonformal
choice of law approaches. In Part III, the shift from formalism to
nonformalism in choice of law methodology is analyzed from the
perspective of a general theory of judicial shifts between major legal
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Washington; B.A., 1967, University of
California (Berkeley); J.D., 1973, Harvard Law School.
1. 70 Wn. 2d 893, 425 P.2d 623 (1967).
2. The "significant contact" approach was subsequently adopted for tort cases in
Werner v. Werner, 84 Wn. 2d 360, 526 P.2d 370 (1974). Current Washington choice
of law methods will be examined in more detail in Part IV infra.
3. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934).
4. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFCONFLICT OF LAWS (1971).
5. See generally A. VON MEHREN & D. TRAUTMAN, THE LAW OF MULTISTATE PROB-
LEMS (1965); Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 1959
DUKE L.J. 171; Morris, The Proper Law of a Tort, 64 HARV. L. REV. 881 (1951).
6. See, e.g., Bernkrant v. Fowler, 55 Cal. 2d 588, 360 P.2d 906, 12 Cal. Rptr. 266
(1961); Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954); Lilianthal v. Kaufman,
239 Ore. 1, 395 P.2d 543 (1964).
7. The court explicitly left open the details of the new approach. Baffin Land Corp.
v. Monticello Motor Inn, Inc., 70 Wn. 2d 893, 900, 425 P.2d 623, 627 (1967). See P.
Trautman, Evolution in Washington Choice of Law--A Beginning, 43 WASH. L. REV.
309 (1967). The contours of Washington choice of law methodology that do emerge
from Baffin and its progeny are discussed in Part IV infra.
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paradigms. Finally, Washington law is discussed in Part IV with
suggestions for its development.
I. FORMAL VERSUS NONFORMAL DECISIONMAKING 8
A formal decision uses less than all available relevant information
by following a rule which screens from the decisionmaker's considera-
tion all information not specifically invoked by the rule. 9 The lex loci
delictus choice of law rule is formal because it directs the judge to
ignore all facts except the place of the wrong when choosing appli-
cable law. 10 In contrast, a nonformal decisionmaker reaches a
"proper" result without first screening any information from consider-
ation.
A formal decisionmaking process need not be arbitrary or divorced
from considerations that would inform a nonformal decision. A rule-
maker might consider all relevant facts and policies when determining
the content of a rule so that it mandates results that approximate the
results of nonformal decisions. A rule is formal because once it is
adopted, it alone, rather than the policies which generated it, becomes
the source of decision. Whereas nonformal decisionmaking looks to
the entirety of a factual situation and arrives at a conclusion with di-
rect reference to an ultimate standard of correctness, a formal rule is
opaque to the considerations upon which it is based. I '
8. See generally Kennedy, Legal Formality, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 351 (1973).
9. Erlich & Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD.
257, 258 (1974).
10. Richardson v. Pacific Power, 11 Wn. 2d 288, 118 P.2d 985 (1941); RESTATE-
MENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 378 (1934). Under the lex loci delictus rule. the inquiry
into the place of the wrong may itself be a complex question, see Alabama Great S.R.R.
v. Carroll, 97 Ala. 126, 11 So. 803 (1892); RESTATEMENT, supra at § 377, but the in-
quiry is nevertheless formal because once it is determined where the wrong occurred.
all other facts are screened from the decisionmaking process.
11. Even if a rule, when obeyed, is opaque to the policies which generated it. the
moral decision to obey or disobey a rule need not treat the rule as opaque. A moral
theory may treat rules as being transparent, translucent or opaque in their obligatory
force. If a decision to obey or disobey a rule is made without reference to the fact that
it is a rule and thereby furthers formal values, the rule can be considered to be trans-
parent to other moral considerations affecting the prescribed conduct. On the other
hand, if a rule is obeyed without reference to any factors other than to its own, self-
proclaimed legitimacy, then the moral decision to obey it treats it as being opaque. If
a decision to obey a rule takes into account both the formal values deriving from the
mere fact that it is a rule and other moral considerations relevant to evaluating the
prescribed conduct, then the rule is treated as being translucent.
Thus, one could hold an opaque, transparent, or translucent theory of obligation to
law depending on whether one believed that disobedience to an unsound or evil law is
Vol. 52: 27, 1976
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controlling decisionmakers who might not be trusted, 15 (5) help ad-
vance certain formal elements of justice by making it more likely that
like cases are decided alike,16 and (6) promote liberty in the sense of
freedom from arbitrary power and the predilections of decision-
makers.' 7 Of course, this is not an exhaustive outline of the benefits of
formal rules,' 8 but it is important to note that an argument in favor of
formal rules is complex and multifaceted. It is tempting to attack a
formal rule by supporting it with one justification (commonly predict-
ability) and then demonstrating that the rule has not obtained its
goal.19 While such a demonstration reduces the strength of the argu-
ment for formal rules, the argument is negated only if all justifications
of formality are overcome.
Formal rules also have detriments, two of which are the "mapping
problem" and the "freezing problem." The mapping problem occurs
standards that place discretion and responsibility on the shoulders of the decision-
maker. Moreover, the rulemaker might wish to defer to the judgment of the decision-
maker for reasons of expertise.
15. See Erlich & Posner, supra note 9, at 267. This assertion must be tentative be-
cause formal rules have the disadvantage of deciding some cases contrary to the desire
of the rulemaker who promulgated them. See notes 21-22 and accompanying text
infra.
Even if the decisionmaker is willing to submit to the rulemaker's will, formal rules
facilitate the process because they are more understandable than nonformal rules. See
R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 92 (1975). This is especially significant when the
decisionmaker is a lay person conducting daily affairs. It is also significant for the ac-
ceptance of decisions by those who are affected.
16. This depends, of course, on what is meant by deciding like cases alike. One
might conclude that two cases are decided alike when the decisions are based upon
policies behind rules which are applied teleologically. See, e.g., von Mehren, Recent
Trends in Choice-of-Law Methodology, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 927, 941-46 (1975). But
even if this is theoretically true (which is not necessarily so), the reduction of error
and bias effected by formality contributes practically to equality of justice.
One need not favor formal elements ofjustice over substantive elements to recognize
the value of formal justice. In a translucent theory of rules, both formal and substan-
tive elements of justice contribute to the calculus. See note 11 supra. In a translucent
theory, it is erroneous to conclude either that like cases should be decided alike re-
gardless of their substantive content, or that "incorrectly" decided cases should never
be followed simply for the sake of equality. A theory is translucent toward rules
whenever it values both formal and substantive elements of justice and makes neither
lexically prior to the other. See, e.g., J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 235-51 (1971);
J. ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 62-65, 72-83, 151-54 (Penguin ed. M. Cranston
transl. 1968); Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3, 13-24 (1955).
17. See F. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 11-21, 133-61 (1960); J. RAWLS,
supra note 16, at 235-43; J. ROUSSEAU, supra note 16. While formalism may increase
liberty vis-a-vis decisionmakers, it does not remove the power of rulemakers. But those
affected by the decisionmaker might themselves be the authors of the rules. See J.
ROUSSEAU, supra.
18. See Erlich & Posner, supra note 9, at 262-67.
19. See, e.g., Baffin Land Corp. v. Monticello Motor Inn, Inc., 70 Wn. 2d 893, 899,
425 P.2d 623, 626 (1967).
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Formal decisions derive both their benefits and detriments from
their rigidity and exclusion of relevant information. They (1) are
likely to be predictable, facilitating private planning and reducing liti-
gation, 12 (2) are easier to apply because the limited scope of informa-
tion is more manageable, 13 (3) help shift responsibility from decision-
makers to rulemakers, 14 (4) help rulemakers transmit their values by
never, always, or sometimes moral. A translucent conception of obligation to rules.
assigning some but not infinite weight to their formal value, is compatible with an
opaque notion of the application of rules, once it has been determined they will be
obeyed. See generally Kennedy, supra note 8, at 371; McCloskey, An Examination of
Restricted Utilitarianism, 66 PHIL. REV. 466 (1957); Powers, Autonomy and the Legal
Control of Self-Regarding Conduct, 51 WASH. L. REV. 33, 56-57 & n.63 (1975); Smart.
Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism, 6 PHIL. Q. 344 (1956); Wasserstrom, The Obli-
gation To Obey the Law, 10 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 780 (1963).
Even in their application, once obedience has been secured, rules need not be con-
sidered as being opaque. An. understanding of the purposes behind a rule might be
necessary to understand its meaning. See H. Hart & A. Sachs, The Legal Process (un-
published work. 1958); Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to LaH--A Reply to Professor
Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630, 661-69 (1958). This need not be of great concern for the
present inquiry, however, since the meaning of formal choice of law rules is usually
clear. But see Reese, Does Doinicil Bear a Single Meaning?, 55 COLUM. L. REV. 589
(1955). Moreover, the inquiry here is directed to the issue of formal versus nonformal
decisions, assuming that the ineaning of formal rules can be understood.
The distinction drawn here between formal and nonformal decisions is related to the
distinction between rules on the one hand and principles and policies on the other. If
a formal rule is not followed, it is considered broken or altered, but a principle or
policy that fails to persuade in a nonformal decision retains its vitality. See Dworkin.
Hard Cases, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1057 (1975); Dworkin. The Model of Rufles, 35 U.
CHI. L. REV. 14 (1967).
12. See, e.g., Neumeier v. Kuehner, 31 N.Y.2d 121, 127. 286 N.E.2d 454. 457. 335
N.Y.S.2d 64, 69 (1972). But cf. Steeg. Strict Liability and Judicial Resources, 3 J.
LEGAL STUD. 217 (1974). Litigation concerning the fringes of a rule and disputed facts
will, of course, remain. Formal decisions need not be absolutely predictable to facilitate
planning; indeed, they cannot be since the application of the rule always involves a
degree of uncertainty. See, e.g., University of Chicago v. Dater. 277 Mich. 658. 270
N.W. 175 (1936); Val Blatz Brewing Co. v. Gerard. 201 Wis. 474, 230 N.W. 622
(1930); 0. W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 464-70 (1897).
They need merely be more predictable than nonformal processes.
While a reduction of litigation seems a desirable goal, an elimination of litigation is
not necessarily desirable. Appellate litigation facilitates official public debate and offers
common law rulemakers an opportunity to alter the rules. See notes 85-91 and accom-
panying text infra.
13. For example, the Statute of Frauds or parol evidence rule makes more man-
ageable the inquiry into the parties' interests by excluding oral testimony. Similarly.
judicial inquiry concerning the meaning of a statute would be unmanageable if mem-
bers of the legislature could be called to give oral testimony.
14. See generally Powers, supra note 11. This is especially relevant when rule-
makers are democratically elected legislatures and decisionmakers are less politically
responsible courts. Of course, courts can never fully escape responsibility for even the
most formal decisions. Rules must be interpreted and applied to facts, and the court
can never escape ultimate responsibility for the decision to follow the rule. See note I I
sttpra; J. SARTRE, EXISTENTIALISM AND HUMANISM 23-37 (Methuen ed. P. Mairet transl.
1948).
Just as the decisionmaker might seek to escape responsibility by applying formal
rules, the rulemaker might seek to escape responsibility by promulgating nonformal
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because rules do not always translate (map) perfectly the policies
which generated them into results in individual cases. 20 By its very na-
ture, a formal rule excludes relevant information from the decision-
making process, raising the possibility that the rule will produce a re-
sult in an individual case contrary to that supported by the policies
which underlie the rule. This is not to say that the rule is a bad one or
should be abandoned; it may be the one easily applied formal rule
that reaches correct results (i.e., maps policies onto results in indi-
vidual cases) in more cases than any other simple rule. Where map-
ping problems arise, however, it is necessary to determine whether the
benefits of formalism outweigh the detriment of some incorrect re-
sults. 21
The "freezing problem" occurs when formal rules freeze the deci-
sionmaking process into a set of rules that reflect values of one era
which are no longer held in the next. Although this is especially signif-
icant when the rulemaker is itself an institution of changing member-
ship like a court or legislature, freezing is a significant problem even
for individual rulemakers as their values change.22 Viewing this
problem from another perspective, a rulemaker promulgates a rule at
time T, based on values held at TI in conjunction with a prediction of
the way in which the rule will affect events at T2. Rules freeze the gen-
erating values held at T, but not T2 and are responsive to conditions at
20. Like a geographic mapping process that projects regions of a sphere onto a
plane, rules project policies onto cases. In both situations inaccuracies are introduced,
and they are tolerated because the plane and the rule system are easier to handle than
the sphere and the policies, respectively.
21. See Erlich & Posner, supra note 9, at 268-70. See generally Kennedy, supra
note 8.
The mapping problem puts tremendous pressure on formal rules. The .parties and
the decisionmaker are understandably distressed when a rule mandates a "bad" result,
but it must be remembered that the result is "incorrect" even in the eyes of the rule-
maker. There need not be a conflict in values between the rulemaker and decision-
maker, although such a conflict will, of course, put added pressure on the rule. Be-
cause the mapping problem presumably distresses both the rulemaker and the decision-
maker, at first glance it seems foolish to follow the rule, especially since the detriments
of the mapping problem manifest themselves immediately and concretely, whereas
many of the benefits of formal rules are general and remote. Nevertheless, refusing to
follow the rule tends to undermine the values of formalism.
22. Of course, this might itself be a justification rather than a detriment of formal
rules. Institutional rulemakers of one era foreseeing changes in institutional composi-
tion might wish to guard against changing values by binding future generations, or at
least requiring the conscious effort of formally changing the rule. Even an individual
rulemaker might desire to bind his future self to judgments made according to present
values. For example, Odysseus tied himself td the mast in order to protect himself
against the lure of the Sirens. See G. Dworkin, Paternalism, in MORALITY AND THE LAW
107, 108-09 (R. Wasserstrom ed. 1971); Powers, supra note 11, at 46-50.
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T, that might not exist at T2. Even if the rulemaker's values do not
change between T, and T2, his prediction concerning the state of
events at T2 will be at least slightly inaccurate. Thus, the rulemaker
may be partially dissatisfied at T2 with the relationship between the
rule and reality. 23
In addition to the mapping and freezing problems, the mechanical
application of formal rules can be perceived as an undignified, subser-
vient task unworthy of judges. 24 Blind acceptance of formal rules may
also dull rather than hone a decisionmaker's ability to make non-
formal decisions when necessary. Because formal rules screen consid-
erations relevant to their continuing efficacy from the decisionmaking
process, rulemakers and the public are precluded from considering
difficult issues with which they may later be forced to grapple.2 5 Fi-
nally, the application of formal rules can become a bad habit. Rules
may mandate bad results (either because they exhibit serious mapping
or freezing problems or because they promote undesirable or evil poli-
cies), and a prudent rulemaker might want to foster sufficient rule
skepticism to guard against future abuse.26
23. Of course, rulemakers have the ability to change rules, which is a significant
safety valve to mitigate the freezing phenomenon. The process of changing rules has
costs, however, that prevent the freezing problem from being completely alleviated.
See Erlich & Posner, supra note 9, at 267-68. Courts find it difficult to change rules
under the doctrine of stare decisis and the accompanying obligation to elaborate rea-
soned distinctions between cases involving different results. Also, because the legislative
rulemaking process expends resources, legislatures can focus on only a limited number
of problems at one time. Moreover, the values that support formal rules are under-
mined if rules are frequently changed. Indeed, at the limit of increasing frequency of
rule changes, formal rules become indistinguishable from nonformal decisions.
24. See, e.g., J. S. MILL. ON LIBERTY 58-59 (Crofts ed. 1947); J. SARTRE. supra
note 14, at 23-37; Thoreau, Civil Disobedience, in CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE: THEORY AND
PRACTICE 27 (H. Bedau ed. 1969).
25. Of course, public debate concerning the efficacy of rules can take place in for-
ums other than the decisionmaking process. The decisionmaking process is an especially
appropriate forum, however, both because it is convenient and because it tempers
argument in the forge of decision.
26. See Thoreau, stupra note 24, at 28-29, 34: Milgram, Some Conditions of Obe-
dience and Disobedience to Authority, 6 INT". J. PSYCHIATRY 259 (1968).
A deeper problem of rules is the effect they have on human interaction and commu-
nity. Both rules and the roles they define can cause persons to relate to others accord-
ing to those roles as partial rather than entire instances of humanity. thereby impeding
a true community of souls. See R. UNGER, supra note 15. passin. Moreover. to the
extent that rule and role structures evoke rational, calculated, egoistic behavior, they
impede Underground spontaneity and Dionysian dissolution and transcendence of self
in favor of Appollonian rationality and individualism. See Powers, supra note II at
52-54 & n.49, F. DOSTOYEVSKY, NOTES FROM UNDERGROUND, in THREE SHORT NOVELS
25. 41-46 (Dell-Laurel ed. C. Garnett transl. 1960); F. NIETZSCHE, The Birth of
Tragedy from the Spirit of Music, in THE BIRTH OF TRAGEDY & THE GENEALOGY OF
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The decision either to adopt or to apply formal rules is a compli-
cated one. A wholly satisfactory resolution of the tension between
formal and ad hoc, nonformal adjudication is impossible because the
shortcomings of both approaches cannot be simultaneously elimi-
nated. Rather, a solution that minimizes those problems or maximizes
the net benefits of both approaches must be sought. It is not the pur-
pose of this article to work out such a general solution.27 Indeed, the
competing values of each approach manifest themselves with varying
strengths in different areas of the law, making it reasonable to adopt a
relatively formal approach in one area and a relatively nonformal
approach in the next.
An important conclusion to draw from a general understanding of
the competing and often irreconcilable values of each approach is that
formalism cannot be critiqued with reference to its difficulties alone.
A worthwhile assessment of formalism in a given area of the law re-
quires a careful study of both approaches to determine whether for-
malism or nonformalism is, on balance, a more desirable approach.
To a large extent, a proper answer will depend on empirical data, but
a lack of empirical data need not prevent a court from making its best
judgments with available information and with reference to the com-
plexity of the competing concerns and values of formal and non-
formal approaches.
It remains to apply the fruits of this discussion to proposed choice
of law methodologies. The lex loci approach of the first Restatement
represents the most formal choice of law methodology because the
decisionmaker simply identifies a fact (e.g., place of the tort) and
choice of law is mechanically determined by a rule.28 All other facts
MORALS 19 (Anchor Books ed. F. Golffing transl. 1956); P. MILLER, THE LIFE OF THE
MIND IN AMERICA 99-104 (Harvest ed. 1965).
Whatever the problems of formal rules in deep social theory, however, their practical
values are significant within a rule-oriented legal system, especially when, as in choice
of law, the conflicts can be viewed as being between artificial sovereignties rather than
"whole" human individuals. Whatever the merits of a nonformal society as a utopian
goal, choice of law is not a likely candidate for a place to begin.
27. For one such model, see Erlich & Posner, supra note 9. A solution could take
the form of a "synthesis" of the formal and nonformal poles, as is attempted in H.
Hart & A. Sachs, supra note 11, or a "mixture" as is contained in the translucent
model sketched in note I 1 supra. See Kennedy, supra note 8.
28. See, e.g., Escrow Serv. Co. v. Cressler, 59 Wn. 2d 38, 365 P.2d 760 (1961)
(place of contract governs validity); Griswold v. Ramsey, 62 Wn. 2d 700, 384 P.2d 635
(1963) (place of tort governs issues of tort liability); Mirgon v. Sherk, 196 Wash. 690,
84 P.2d 362 (1938) (place of performance of contract governs issues of performance);
RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 311-47, 377-90 (1934).
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and considerations are screened from consideration. If the lex loci
rules are analyzed as an attempt formally to map the policies of the
"most significant contact" approach onto individual cases, it can be
seen that the exclusion of relevant information causes mapping errors.
For example, lex loci delictus identifies the jurisdiction with the most
significant contacts in more cases than any other simple rule, but it
seems to reach an incorrect result in situations involving a compensa-
tory issue where the plaintiff and defendant are residents of one juris-
diction and the accident takes place in another. 29
This mapping error can be remedied by adopting a method that uti-
lizes the very information that causes us to realize lex loci maps with
29. Compare Alabama Great S.R.R. v. Carroll, 97 Ala. 126, 11 So. 803 (1892).
and Victor v. Sperry, 163 Cal. App. 2d 518, 329 P.2d 728 (1958), with Schmidt v.
Driscoll Hotel, Inc., 249 Minn. 376, 82 N.W.2d 365 (1957), and Mitchell v. Craft. 211
So.2d 509 (Miss. 1968).
If we assume that the concerned jurisdictions are the place where the injury occurred
and the domicile of the two parties, the following types of situations can arise:
Type Plaintiffs Defendant's Place of Ad hoc
Domicile Domicile Tort Preference
(I) X X X X
(2) X X Y X
(3) X Y X X
(4) X Y Y Y
(5) X Y Z Z
Actually. 27 permutations exist, but they are instances of one of these five types. For
example, YYY and ZZZ cases are, for our purposes, indistinguishable from XXX cases
and therefore are represented by type (1). Type (1) represents three of the 27 per-
mutations, and types (2)-(5) each represent six of the 27 permutations. Thus. if the
three variables were independent, each type would randomly occur in 2/9 of the cases.
with the exception of type (1), which would randomly occur in 1/9 of the cases.
If we assume that a jurisdiction with the most connections has the greatest interest
in having its law applied and that where each jurisdiction has one connecting factor
the place of the tort has a slightly stronger interest, we notice that the lex loci rule
handles most cases in the same fashion as a direct appeal to this more ultimate stan-
dard. Moreover, the three connecting factors might not vary randomly and indepen-
dently. A tendency might exist for at least one of the parties to be domiciled in the
jurisdiction where the tort occurred, thereby reducing the proportion of type (2) cases
where an incorrect result is reached. Thus, if a simple rule is desired, lex loci delictus
might be the best. The issue is whether we want a single simple rule. Of course, lex
loci delictus exhibits a mapping problem like all formalities: it decides cases of type (2)
incorrectly. This alone does not, however, condemn the rule. The issue is whether these
"wrong" results are an excessive price for the benefits of a single, simple rule.
Of course, the tie-breaker assumption favors the lex loci rule. We might justify a
"'place of the plaintiff's domicile" rule with another tie-breaker assumption. If we
lack other information, however, some form of tie-breaker rule is required to handle
type (5). A lex loci tie-breaker is justified because it involves the most easily ascertain-
able fact and it points to the jurisdiction that has both a regulatory and a (short term)
compensatory interest. See, e.g., Brown, Toward an Economic Theory of Liability,
2 J. LEGAL S-1t4. 323 (1973); Williams, The Aims of the Law of Tort, 4 CURRENT LEGAL
PROBLEMS 137 (1951); cf. Watson v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66
(1954).
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less than perfect accuracy: the nature of the issue and an expanded list
of connecting factors. 30 This new method-grouping of contacts-is
less formal than lex loci because it attempts to make a more direct
appeal to the criterion of significance by utilizing more relevant infor-
mation. By taking into account information not available under the
lex loci method, the judge could reach a "correct" result in cases
where lex loci reached "incorrect" results. A greater propensity for
correct results, however, is achieved at the cost of a partial loss of the
benefits of formalism because the decision requires more information
and calls for a more subjective judgment.31
Grouping of contacts is itself a formal approach because it ex-
cludes from consideration other relevant information: the content of
each jurisdiction's rule and the policies it reflects. By including this
new information in its calculus, "interest analysis" eliminates some of
the mapping errors encountered when using the grouping of contacts
approach.32 Whereas grouping of contacts counts a contact in all
30. For torts these would include:
(a) the place where the injury occurred,
(b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred,
(c) the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business
of the parties, and
(d) the place where the relationship,. if any, between the parties is centered.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145(2) (1971). For contracts, ab-
sent a choice by the parties, they include:
(a) the place of contracting,
(b) the place of negotiation of the contract,
(c) the place of performance,
(d) the location of the subject matter of the contract, and,
(e) the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business
of the parties.
1a. at § 188(2).
31. Lex loci can also be criticized for its failure to secure absolute predictability.
Judgments concerning the applicability and application of the first Restatement rules
(formulation and characterization) create uncertainty. See, e.g., University of Chicago
v. Dater, 277 Mich. 658, 270 N.W. 175 (1936); A. VON MEHREN & D. TRAUTMAN,
supra note 5, at 487-92. Compare Val Blatz Brewing Co. v. Gerard, 201 Wis. 474,
230 N.W. 622 (1930), with Alabama Great S.R.R. v. Carroll, 97 Ala. 126, 11 So. 803
(1892). The relevant consideration, however, is their incremental addition to predict-
ability. They can also be criticized as reaching fortuitous results. See, e.g., Goranson
v. Capital Airlines, Inc., 345 F.2d 750 (6th Cir. 1965).
The propensity of formalism to exhibit mapping and freezing problems while failing
to entail results was recognized by 0. W. Holmes in The Path of the Law, supra note
12, at 464-70. Nevertheless, he advocated formal rules. See Baltimore & 0. Ry. v.
Goodman, 275 U.S. 66 (1927) (stop, look, and listen rule); 0. W. HOLMES, THE COM-
MON LAW 89-90 (Howe ed. 1963). See generally, J. NOONAN, PERSONS AND'MAsKS OF
THE LAW 66-73, 102-10 (1976).
32. Interest analysis as it is used here iost closely corresponds to Brainerd Currie's
governmental interest methodology. See Currie, supra note 5. It also corresponds to
the methodology used in Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240
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cases, interest analysis counts a contact only if it indicates that a
policy behind that jurisdiction's rule comes into play (i.e., is mani-
fested) in the specific factual situation. Thus, interest analysis more
finely tunes the analysis to the actual interests of each jurisdiction in
individual cases. But again, formal benefits are mitigated, because the
identification of policies behind each jurisdiction's substantive rule is a
subjective and energy-consuming task.33
Interest analysis, in turn, is itself a formality because it excludes
still further relevant information from the analysis. It considers only
those policies that support a jurisdiction's domestic rule (i.e., the
dominant policies that prevailed in the debate whether to adopt one
rule or another). In reality, however, a substantive rule reflects a com-
promise between competing policies, including policies that were sup-
pressed when the rule was adopted. Additionally, jurisdictions have
special interests in multistate situations-such as projecting an image
of evenhandedness or upholding expectations which are more legiti-
mate than in wholly domestic situations-that are not necessarily re-
flected in their domestic rules. 34 By taking into account suppressed
and special multistate interests, "functional analysis" better gauges the
strength of each jurisdiction's interest in an attempt to reach correct
results in more individual cases. 35 But again, the insertion of a new
level of subjectivity undermines formal values.
Finally, even functional analysis can be analyzed as a formality.
Although it takes into account all interests of each jurisdiction, it
limits the choice of law to the domestic rules of the concerned juris-
dictions. By screening from consideration outcomes other than those
dictated by the competing domestic rules, even functional analysis
fails to maximize the reconciliation of interests among competing ju-
N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963); Reich v. Purcell, 67 Cal. 2d 551, 432 P.2d 727. 63 Cal. Rptr.
31 (1967); Potlatch No. I Fed. Credit Union v. Kennedy, 76 Wn. 2d 806. 459 P.2d
32 (1969). There is also evidence that this is the type of method contemplated by the
drafters of the second Restatement. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws
§ 188, comment c (1971).
33. See Part II infra. The change in formal benefits along the range of increasing
nonformality is neither necessarily linear nor negatively sloped. For instance, it might
well be that interest analysis is more predictable or at least only slightly less predictable
than grouping of contacts.
34. See, e.g., In re Chappell, 124 Wash. 128, 213 P. 684 (1923); People v. One
1953 Ford Victoria, 48 Cal.2d 595, 311 P.2d 480 (1957); Lilianthal v. Kaufman. 239
Ore. 1, 395 P.2d 543 (1964); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6
(1971).
35. See A. VON MEHREN & D. TRAUTMAN, supra note 5, at 80-435.
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risdictions. Thus, a method permitting special multistate results that
compromise competing concerns would be even less formal and would
theoretically reach correct results in more individual cases. 36 The sub-
jectivity of the method, however, nearly eliminates the benefits of
formalism.
An informed choice -among choice of law methodologies cannot be
made with reference to the rhetoric of either formalism or nonformalism
alone. Rather, it should be made with an appreciation of the advantages
and disadvantages of each approach in an attempt to find the level of
formality that maximizes overall benefits.
II. TWO PROBLEMS
The respective difficulties of formal and nonformal choice of law
methodologies can be better understood by examining their specific
applications. This section will first examine the difficulties encoun-
tered by the New York Court of Appeals when using interest analysis
in host-guest statute cases. Next, the shortcomings of the formal ap-
proach are illustrated through a discussion of the inability of formal
rules to deal with the problem of validation for multistate transac-
tions. These specific problems are presented to demonstrate that the
selection of a choice of law methodology poses a dilemma and that
different methods representing different levels of formality may be
appropriate for different areas of law.
A. The New York Experience with Host-Guest Statutes
Babcock v. Jackson37 was heralded as a breakthrough for interest
analysis and a welcome rejection of the talismanic, rule-oriented ap-
proach of the first Restatement.38 Babcock and its progeny demon-
strate, however, the difficulties of abandoning rules. Indeed, as shall
be seen in the final case of the New York series, Neumeier v. Kueh-
36. See von Mehren, Special Substantive Rules for Multistate Problems: Their
Role and Significance in Contemporary Choice of Latv Methodology, 88 HARV. L. REV.
347 (1974).
37. 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
38. See, e.g., Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent Development in Con-
flict of Laws, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 1212, 1219 (Cavers), 1233 (B. Currie), 1247
(Leflar), 1251 (Reese) (1963). New York rejected lex loci contractus, but did not
explicitly adopt interest analysis, in Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99
(1954).
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ner,39 the court abandoned a purely ad hoc, nonformal approach in
favor of a new rule. The factors that led the New York court to reach
this conclusion in Neumeier can inform a court embarking on a sim-
ilar journey.
Georgia Babcock was injured when the car in which she was a pas-
senger went out of control, left the highway, and crashed into an adja-
cent stone wall. The car was driven by her friend, William Jackson,
who with his wife and Ms. Babcock was on a weekend outing to On-
tario, Canada, where the accident occurred. Ms. Babcock and the
Jacksons were New York residents, and the car was garaged and reg-
istered there. Ms. Babcock sued Mr. Jackson in New York alleging
negligence, and the choice of law issue was whether the claim was
barred by Ontario's host-guest statute or allowed by New York law,
which permitted suits by guests against their hosts.
Methodologically, the issue was whether Ontario law should be
applied merely because Ontario was the place of the tort, as required
by lex loci delictus. The court rejected lex loci delictus and used in-
terest analysis to apply New York law as the law of the jurisdiction
with the most significant contact. The court divined that Ontario's
host-guest statute was designed "to prevent the fraudulent assertion of
claims by passengers, in collusion with the drivers, against insurance
companies .... -40 Because the Ontario statute was designed to pro-
tect insurance companies against collusive claims by friendly hosts
and guests, and because an Ontario insurance company was not in-
volved in this case, the court reasoned that Ontario had no legitimate
interest in having its host-guest statute applied. 41 On the other hand,
the applicability of "New York's policy of requiring a tort-feasor to
compensate his guest for injuries caused by his negligence [could not]
be doubted, '42 because the case involved a New York guest.
On the face of the opinion, Babcock is a powerful case for interest
39. 31 N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972).
40. 12 N.Y.2d at 482-83. 191 N.E.2d at 284, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 750. citing Survey
of Canadian Legislation, I U. TORONTO L.J. 358, 366 (1935).
41. The court stated: "'Whether New York defendants are imposed upon or their
insurers defrauded by a New York plaintiff is scarcely a valid legislative concern of
Ontario simply because the accident occurred there ..... 12 N.Y.2d at 483. 191
N.E.2d at 284, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 750.
According to the typing of methodologies developed in Part 1. the court used in-
terest analysis rather than functional analysis. For example, the court did not consider
that as the place of the accident, Ontario had a suppressed. manifested, short-term
compensation interest.
42. Id.
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analysis. Whereas lex loci delictus compels the application of Ontario
law, an examination of the policies behind each jurisdiction's rule and
the applicability of those policies to the facts reveals a false conflict,
with New York alone holding an interest in having its law applied.
Lex loci delictus simply commits an egregious mapping error. Closer
analysis, however, reveals problems with the court's seemingly simple
application of interest analysis.
Once the court determined that the Ontario host-guest statute re-
flected a policy of protecting Ontario insurers from fraudulent claims,
it was necessary to determine whether an Ontario insurer was in-
volved. The court noted that the plaintiff and defendant were New
York residents and that the car was garaged and licensed there and
concluded that the car was "undoubtedly insured in New York. '43
It is unclear why this necessarily negates Ontario's interest. Even
with the territorial assumption that the well-being of New York de-
fendants and insurers is "scarcely a valid legislative concern of Onta-
rio"44 (which is not self-evidently correct), it is unclear what is meant
by a "New York insurer." The presumed New York insurer in Bab-
cock was doing business in Ontario, at least to the extent that it in-
sured risks in Ontario. If one of Ontario's policies is to encourage in-
suring risks within its territory and its host-guest statute advances this
policy by protecting insurance companies from collusive suits, then
Ontario has an interest in applying its host-guest statute to any acci-
dent occurring in Ontario.45 New York may have a greater interest
than Ontario, but it is no longer clear, as the court asserts, that "On-
tario has no conceivable interest in denying a remedy to a New York
guest against his New York host for injuries suffered in Ontario by
reason of conduct which was tortious under Ontario law."'46
Another policy which might support Ontario's host-guest statute
concerns the regulation of conduct within Ontario's borders. 47 Anti-
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. It is true that the insurer was willing to insure risks in New York without the
protection of a host-guest statute, but this does not necessarily mean that it would be
willing to do so elsewhere where defense burdens or other costs might be greater.
46. 12 N.Y.2d at 482, 191 N.E.2d at 284, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 750.
47. Nor is this the only interest Ontario might have in the application of its host-
guest statute. It might have an interest, arising from a conception of justice, favoring
the application of the rule equally to all accidents occurring in Ontario. Ontario's in-
terest here might be either a direct concern for equality or an attempt to satisfy a
feeling of its citizens that all accidents in Ontario should be governed by uniform law.
To be sure, a persuasive argument can be made that treating like cases alike depends
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compensation rules such as host-guest statutes protect the assets of
tortfeasors, a matter of primary concern to the jurisdiction with which
the tortfeasor has a continuing relationship. Liability-limiting rules,
however, also influence conduct.48 Expanded damages theoretically
cause people to be more careful, and limited damages (or a rule that
eliminates damages in certain circumstances) will theoretically tend to
make people less careful. Because this is a conduct-regulating effect
and the conduct in Babcock occurred in Ontario, Ontario had a po-
tential interest in having its host-guest statute applied.
It is tempting to conclude that Ontario is indifferent to whether
people are more careful, especially when the sanction to make them
more careful is not paid by an Ontario resident. At some point, how-
ever, the costs of extra care (including both direct costs of safety and
foregone opportunities to engage in worthwhile but risky activities)
outweigh its benefits. 49 Other things being equal, Ontario presumably
has an interest in having people use the optimum amount of care
within its borders. This interest will be frustrated when either too
much or too little care is exercised.
If the benefits of taking chances accrue only to the actor, Ontario
might be interested only in ensuring that its own citizens can take
chances without excessive fear of damages. If the actor's risk-creating
activity has collateral benefits for others in Ontario, however, the
mere fact that the conduct occurs in Ontario is sufficient to trigger
Ontario's interest in having its liability-limiting rule applied. Again, it
is difficult to agree, at least on the information given by the court, that
"Ontario has no conceivable interest" in having its law applied to the
facts of Babcock.50
on treating them according to the purposes of the rules that govern them. New York's
refusal to apply the Ontario host-guest statute in Babcock might not offend a duty to
treat like cases alike, because the refusal occurred in a situation where the rule's pur-
poses, as perceived by the court, did not come into play. This, however, is beside the
point. Ontario's conception of treating like cases alike, unlike New York's, might be to
treat every accident occurring in Ontario alike regardless of the residence of the parties.
Of course, it is possible that Ontario does not have such an interest. But the court in
Babcock did not consider whether or not it does, undermining its assertion that
"Ontario has no conceivable interest" in having its law applied.
A related difficulty is the source of information necessary to ascertain a jurisdiction's
interests. The court in Babcock utilized a periodical. See note 40 supra. It is unlikely
that courts will be able to do more than divine policies that might support a rule.
48. See generally Brown, Toward an Economic Theory of Liability, 2 J. LEGAL
STUD. 323 (1973); Diamond, Single Activity Accidents, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 107 (1974);
Posner, A Theory of Negligence, I J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972).
49. Thus. Ontario does not impose a ten-mile-per-hour speed limit, even though it
would increase highway safety.
50. See text accompanying note 46 supra. Another interest Ontario might have in
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The point of this analysis is not to demonstrate that Babcock was
incorrectly decided. Even if all of Ontario's "conceivable" interests
are included in the interest analysis calculus, New York's interest in
compensating its plaintiff from the pocket of its defendant seems to
outweigh the interests of Ontario. What the analysis does reveal is the
fundamental difficulty of interest analysis: identifying accurately the
policies reflected in the rules of competing, concerned jurisdictions.
To the extent that the identification of policies behind various rules
becomes indeterminable and subject to manipulation, the method
itself becomes inconclusive and subject to manipulation. If interest
analysis is covertly manipulable or subject to unwitting error, either
by judges identifying policies or by skillful lawyers suggesting policies,
the benefits of formalism are seriously undermined.51
The problems encountered in the Babcock analysis multiplied when
the New York court encountered variant factual situations. In Dym v.
Gordon,52 the host and guest were again New York residents, and the
car was registered there. Rather than taking a weekend trip outside
New York, however, both parties were attending summer school in
Colorado where the host-guest relationship was formed. The accident
occurred in Colorado and, unlike the single car accident in Babcock,
involved a second car in which third persons were injured.
Using the policies of host-guest statutes identified in Babcock, New
York might have applied its own law, because Colorado would have
"no conceivable interest" in protecting a New York insurer from col-
lusive claims by a New York driver and his New York guest. The
Dym court, however, identified a new policy behind host-guest stat-
utes. The guest was denied recovery in order to protect the recovery
fund-including the defendant's assets and insurance proceeds-for
adopting its host-guest statute is encouraging passengers to be better lookouts, know-
ing that their own safety is in their own hands since they cannot rely on recovery. Of
course, this benefit could be offset by the increased carelessness of drivers, but it might
nevertheless reflect Ontario's judgment concerning the optimum combination of
driver and passenger care. Since this would be a conduct-regulating policy and the
conduct occurred in Ontario, it would be manifested in Babcock. While this might be
a contrived policy, no criteria in Babcock exclude it from the calculus.
51. Even if manipulation and error were not problems, the costs of gathering the
necessary information to apply the method properly are imposing. How did the court
know, for example, that Ontario's actual policy was to prevent collusive claims, that
Ontario was not interested in encouraging socially beneficial risky conduct, or even
that Ontario was not interested in protecting the assets of a New York resident be-
cause they would ultimately be devised to an Ontario heir? Even if interest analysis is
applied with absolute good faith and skill, the costs of accumulating this information
are significant.
52. 16 N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E.2d 792, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1965).
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injured third persons. This was certainly a plausible interest behind
Colorado's host-guest statute, and it was manifested in Dym because
there was an injured Colorado resident for whom the recovery fund
could be protected.
The use of a new policy not even mentioned in Babcock creates the
appearance that policies can be divined to manipulate a result. It
might appear fortuitous to the plaintiff in Dyin that his recovery was
barred because, unlike Ms. Babcock, he was unlucky enough to be
involved in an accident with a second car. The sudden appearance of
a new policy in Dym might be explained by asserting that it was not
manifested in Babcock because there were no Ontario third parties.
For all the court knew, however, a third party might have suffered
damage in Babcock when the car went off the road. Indeed, the Bab-
cock opinion noted that the car hit "an adjacent stone wall," 53 which
suggests that the adjacent landowner might have suffered damage.
Defendant's counsel in Babcock would have perceived no need to
plead and prove that fact at trial, because it was irrelevant to personal
injury tort liability, and it was irrelevant to choice of law prior to
Dym. Thus, Dym appears to result from the identification of a new
policy by counsel or court. This appearance could have been avoided
by a more careful identification of policies in Babcock, but it is the
very difficulty of this task which undermines the viability of interest
analysis.5 4
Dym reveals yet another problem of interest analysis-the lack of a
method for resolving true conflicts. After collecting the information
and identifying the policies necessary to apply interest analysis, the
Dym court demonstrated that both Colorado and New York had an
interest in having their respective rules applied to the facts of the case.
Without formulating criteria by which a true conflict is to be resolved,
53. 12 N.Y.2d at 476, 191 N.E.2d at 280, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 745.
54. Even the facts known to the court in Dyi were insufficient to properly apply
interest analysis. If the totality of claims against the recovery fund were insufficient to
exhaust it, Colorado's interest in ensuring recovery by third parties would not come
into play. But the court made no attempt to determine whether the fund was in dan-
ger of exhaustion. Indeed, to do so would require awaiting settlement of other claims
before determining which law would control the guest's claim, thereby raising ad-
ministrative difficulties as well as the spectre of fortuity in the eyes of the parties.
These difficulties might be mitigated by invoking this policy whenever a third party
injury of any magnitude is involved, but then Babcock might have invoked it as well.
The court might have invoked a special multistate rule simply by giving third par-
ties priority in their claims. See notes 35-36 and accompanying text supra. The court
did not, however, consider this possibility.
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the court simply chose to apply Colorado rather than New York law.
Various methods are available for resolving .true conflicts, but they
either involve elements of formality or raise interest analysis to still
higher levels of sophistication. 55 If a formal approach is used to re-
solve -true conflicts, it is plausible to consider a formal answer (e.g.,
the place of the accident or the plaintiffs domicile) instead of interest
analysis. 56 Even if the difficulty of identifying policies in interest anal-
ysis is sometimes justified, its justification is questionable when it reaps
nothing but a true conflict which is resolved formally.
The New York court encountered still further difficulties with in-
terest analysis in Tooker v. Lopez.57 The factual situation was similar
to that in Dym: the host and guest were New York residents riding in
a "New York car," and the accident occurred in Michigan, where they
were attending school. The only significant difference between the
facts in Tooker and those in Dym was that no third party was injured
in Tooker. This would, of course, indicate that the policy of pro-
tecting the recovery fund did not come into play. The court was will-
ing, however, to overlook this distinction and decide the case as
though it were indistinguishable from Dym. The court then apparently
overruled Dym 58 and applied New York law.59
The error of Dym was revealed in Tooker by a more sophisticated
analysis of the policies behind host-guest statutes. It was now appar-
ent, the court argued, that because the host-guest statutes permit
guests to recover if the host is grossly negligent, they do not reflect a
policy of protecting the recovery fund for injured third parties. 60 The
55. Various methods of resolving true conflicts distinguish submethods within
interest analysis. In addition to subjectively evaluating the respective governmental in-
terests, the court could automatically apply forum law. See, e.g., Currie, supra note 5,
at 178; W. REESE & M. ROSENBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 523-24 (6th ed. 1971) (ex-
plication of Currie's methodology); Lilianthal v. Kaufman, 239 Ore. 1, 395 P.2d 543
(1964). But see Casey v. Manson Constr. & Eng'r. Co., 247 Ore. 274, 428 P.2d 898
(1967). The court could also apply the more enlightened law, see, e.g., R. LEFLAR,
AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW 243-45 (1968), or it could resort to the even less formal
method of functional analysis, see A. VON MEHREN & D. TRAUTMAN, supra note 5, at
80-435.
56. While interest analysis will be useful to the extent that it reveals false con-
flicts, the analysis of Babcock suggests that they will be rare.
57. 24 N.Y.2d 569, 249 N.E.2d 394, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519 (1969).
58. Id. at 574-75, 249 N.E.2d at 397, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 523.
59. See also Macey v. Rozbicki, 18 N.Y.2d 289, 221 N.E.2d 380, 274 N.Y.S.2d
591 (1966).
60. The court reasoned as follows:
The teleological argument advanced by some.., that the guest statute was in-
tended to assure the priority of injured nonguests in the assets of a negligent
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policy, as originally recognized in Babcock, was simply to protect in-
surers against collusive claims:61
The only justification for discrimination between injured guests which
can withstand logical as well as constitutional scrutiny . . . is that the
legitimate purpose of the statute-prevention of fraudulent claims
against local insurers or the protection of local automobile owners-is
furthered by increasing the guest's burden of proof. This purpose can
never be vindicated when the insurer is a New York carrier and the
defendant is sued in the courts of this State. Under such circum-
stances, the jurisdiction enacting such a guest statute has absolutely no
interest in the application of its law.
It is apparent from Tooker that the court had, by its own admission,
made a mistake in at least one of the cases, and under the court's own
analysis the error occurred in Dym, through faulty analysis of policies
behind the host-guest statutes.
The formal approach produces errors due to mapping problems
and justifies those errors by the supposedly greater benefits of for-
malism. Interest analysis, on the other hand, commits errors because
its key ingredient, the identification of policies, is a difficult, subjective
task that is susceptible to abuse and mistake. The theoretical im-
munity of interest analysis from mapping errors is less appealing when
it is realized that so talented a tribunal as the New York Court of
Appeals in fact commits other types of errors. If each method commits
errors, albeit for different reason, we might consider using the method
that at least secures the benefits of formalism. 62
host, in addition to the prevention of fraudulent claims, overlooks not only the
statutory history but the fact that the statute permits recovery by guests who can
establish that the accident was due to the gross negligence of the driver. If the
purpose of the statute is to protect the rights of the injured "non-guest," as op-
posed to the owner or his insurance carrier, we fail to perceive any rational basis
for predicating that protection on the degree of negligence which the guest is able
to establish.
24 N.Y.2d at 575, 249 N.E.2d at 397, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 523-24.
61. Id. at 575,249 N.E.2d at 397, 301N.Y.S.2d at 524.
62. Of course, the fact that interest analysis leads to an error in one case is in-
conclusive. just as the identification of a formal rule's mapping error is an insufficient
critique of that rule. A fully informed decision must be delayed until the frequency of
such errors and the weight to be given to the formal values are known.
A related point which emerges from a comparison of Tooker and Dyrn is that like
cases have not been decided alike. While Tooker and Dym can be factually distin-
guished. the court treated them as being factually equivalent. See also Macey v. Roz-
bicki, 18 N.Y.2d 289, 221 N.E.2d 380, 274 N.Y.S.2d 591 (1966). The plaintiff in
Dym must now be told that although his case was treated as being identical to Tooker,
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Even if Tooker were not inconsistent with Dym, its reasoning is fal-
lacious because it involves a non sequitur. Significantly, it is fallacious
for the very reason under discussion: it inadequately analyzes the poli-
cies behind the Michigan host-guest statute. The court concluded that,
if protecting the recovery fund were a policy behind host-guest stat-
utes, it would be irrational to distinguish between negligent and
grossly negligent conduct so as to protect the fund against the former
but not the latter. There are two reasons why it would not be irra-
tional to make such a distinction. First, protecting the recovery fund
for injured third persons is only one policy behind a host-guest statute;
it supplements the policy of protecting insurance companies from col-
lusive suits. The combination of these policies might persuade Mich-
igan to suppress its policy of compensating victims. But in cases where
the risk of collusive claims is reduced (i.e., where the plaintiff can
prove gross negligence), the policy of protecting the recovery fund
alone might not outweigh the policy of compensating victims. Thus,
the bifurcated standard of a host-guest statute is consistent with a
policy of protecting the recovery fund for injured third persons.
Secondly, Michigan's reason for protecting the recovery fund might
be the likelihood of fraud in guest claims rather than an inherent pref-
erence for third persons over guests. Michigan might feel that what-
ever the equities between guests and third parties in their own right,
third parties at least should have the insurance fund protected against
classes of claims that are more likely to be fraudulent. Under the
Tooker court's analysis of Michigan's policies, guest claims proving
mere negligence are more likely to be fraudulent than those proving
gross negligence. Therefore, it is rational for Michigan to protect the
fund in the former situation but not in the latter. Yet the court was un-
able "to perceive any rational basis for predicating that protection on
the degree of negligence the guest is able to establish. '63 One wonders
a different result was reached in Tooker because the court better understood the
policies behind the host-guest statute. Although this inequality might be outweighed
by benefits of interest analysis, it is a significant cost of nonformalism which should
not be ignored. At least it should make us wary of adopting a method which relies
so heavily on the identification of policies behind rules when an alternative is possible.
Of course, purposive analysis looking to policies might be both an unavoidable and
desirable method of interpreting rules. See Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law--A
Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARv. L. REv. 630, 661-72 (1958). This does not justify
an abandonment of rules, however, in favor of the difficult task of ascertaining policies
in each individual case.
63. 24 N.Y.2d at 575, 249 N.E.2d at 397, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 524.
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whether the court would reinstate Dym if presented with this new
analysis of policies.6 4
New York reduced its methodological problems in Neumeier v.
Keuhner,65 where "[a] domiciliary of Ontario, Canada, was killed
when the automobile in which he was riding, owned and driven by a
New York resident, collided with a train in Ontario."66 In what
looked like another case for interest analysis, the court withdrew from
a case-by-case examination of policies for many of the reasons ex-
plored above. 67 Instead, the court promulgated three rules to decide
host-guest cases. 68 Schematically they are as follows:
(1) Host + guest + car = choice of that jurisdiction's law.
(2a) Host + accident + host-guest statute = choice of that jurisdic-
tion's law.
(2b) Guest + accident + no host-guest statute = choice of that juris-
diction's law.
(3) Otherwise, choose the law of the place of accident unless a reason
exists to displace the normally applicable rule.
The effect of the "unless" clause of rule (3) is unclear. Neurneier pre-
64. After Tooker, an attorney in New York with a host-guest problem might have
had "more need of an ouija board ... than a copy of Shepard's citations." Rosenberg.
Two Views on Kell v. Henderson, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 459. 460 (1967). Even when
applied correctly. interest analysis has information-gathering costs and does not ade-
quately resolve a true conflict. At this point, we might ask whether the mapping
errors caused by a more formal approach are so intolerable that they must be avoided
even at the cost of the confusion created by interest analysis.
65. 31 N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454. 335 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972).
66. Id. at 123-24. 286 N.E.2d at 455, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 66.
67. The court commented as follows:
[0] ur decisions in multi-state highway accident cases, particularly in those in-
volving guest-host controversies, have, it must be acknowledged. lacked consis-
tency. This stemmed, in part, from the circumstance that it is frequently difficult
to discover the purposes or policies underlying the relevant local law rules of the
respective jurisdictions involved. It is even more difficult, assuming that these pur-
poses or policies are found to conflict, to determine on some principled basis
which should be given effect at the expense of the others.
The single all-encompassing rule which called, inexorably, for selection of the
law of the place of injury was discarded, and wisely, because it was too broad to
prove satisfactory in application. There is, however, no reason why choice-of-law
rules, more narrow than those previously devised, should not be successfully de-
veloped, in order to assure a greater degree of predictability and uniformity. on
the basis of our present knowledge and experience.
Id. at 127. 286 N.E.2d at 457. 335 N.Y.S.2d at 69 (citations omitted).
68. The court stated the rules as follows:
1. When the guest-passenger and the host-driver are domiciled in the same state,
and the car is there registered, the law of that state should control and determine
the standard of care which the host owes to his guest.
2. When the driver's conduct occurred in the state of his domicile and that state
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sented a case where it might have been invoked, but "the plaintiff
. . .failed to show that [New York's] connection with the contro-
versy was sufficient to justify displacing the rule of lex loci delictus."69
Because it was not invoked in Neumeier, it is unclear whether it will
ever be invoked, or if it is, how the case could be distinguished from
Neumeier. If the "unless" clause of rule (3) is inoperative, the three
rules are entailed by a much simpler rule:
Lex loci delictus unless guest + host + car coincide in a single state,
in which case that state's rule is applied.
This is simply a slight modification of lex loci delictus to account for
cases where the lex loci mapping problem is most accute.70
The New York experience indicates that the lex loci approach was
erroneous not because it was a rule but because it was not quite the
right rule. It also illustrates the difficulty of nonformal interest anal-
ysis and vindicates the utility of rules as a rational choice of law meth-
odology.
B. Rules of Validation
Although the New York host-guest cases demonstrate the difficul-
ties of interest analysis and vindicate formal rules, the serious map-
ping problems of rules should not be overlooked. This section .will
examine the issue of validating multistate transactions to fulfill legiti-
mate party expectations-an area where rules have special mapping
problems. The inability of rules to deal effectively with this issue high-
does not cast him in liability for that conduct, he should not be held liable by
reason of the fact that liability would be imposed upon him under the tort law of
the state of the victim's domicile. Conversely, when the guest was injured in the
state of his own domicile and its law permits recovery, the driver who has come
into that state should not-in the absence of special circumstances-be permitted
to interpose the law of his state as a defense.
3. In other situations, when the passenger and the driver are domiciled in dif-
erent states, the rule is necessarily less categorical. Normally, the applicable rule
of decision will be that of the state where the accident occurred but not if it can
be shown that displacing that normally applicable rule will advance the relevant
substantive law purposes without impairing the smooth working of the multi-state
system or producing great uncertainty for litigants.
Id. at 128, 286 N.E.2d at 457-58, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 70.
69. Id. at 129, 286 N.E.2d at 458, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 71.
70. See, e.g., Victor v. Sperry, 163 Cal. App. 2d 518, 329 P.2d 728 (1958). See
note 29 supra.
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lights the irreconcilable tension between formalism and nonformalism
and the dilemma it poses for courts.
When cases involving multistate transactions are analyzed individu-
ally-identifying all interests and policies of concerned jurisdictions,
including suppressed and special multistate interests under functional
analysis-a general policy in favor of validating multistate transac-
tions emerges. This is due to the fact that the frustration of party ex-
pectations has greater significance in multistate than in domestic
transactions. The question is whether choice of law methodology
should vindicate this policy on a case-by-case basis or should instead
adopt a formal rule of validation applicable over broad areas of sub-
stantive law.
Even where a state's domestic law frustrates party autonomy with a
rule like the Statute of Frauds, 71 the state need not be insensitive to
the parties' expectations. While a dominant policy supporting the in-
validation of a transaction might have prevailed in the adoption of the
domestic rule, a suppressed interest of upholding party expectations is
nevertheless present. This interest is weaker in a wholly domestic situ-
ation, because the applicable invalidating rule is ascertainable. The
parties can mitigate their frustration by complying with the rule (e.g.,
by putting their contract in writing to comply with the Statute of
Frauds) or can avoid reliance on the transaction if compliance is im-
practicable. 72 On the other hand, in multistate situations the parties
can more legitimately claim ignorance of the applicability of the in-
validating rule. For example, they might legitimately claim that they
thought their transaction was valid under the law of another con-
cerned jurisdiction. Thus, the suppressed interest of upholding party
71. There are issues, like the interpretation of contracts, where the primary goal of
domestic substantive law is to effect the will of the parties. If the parties could have
chosen in substantive terms how to regulate their respective rights and duties, choice of
law principles should adhere to their expression of expectations. Since parties generally
will have anticipated their transactions to be valid, choice of law rules should tend to
validate transactions in areas where the parties are given the power of choice under
domestic substantive law. See Siegelman v. Cunard White Star Ltd., 221 F.2d 189.
194-96 (2d Cir. 1955); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (1971).
But most rules that invalidate transactions, such as the doctrine of consideration and
the Statute of Frauds, are designed specifically to frustrate party choice and autonomy
in certain situations. In these areas, it would be incongruous to base a rule or policy of
validation on party autonomy. But see Siegelman v. Cunard White Star Ltd.. supra;
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (197 1).
72. For example, parties cannot comply with incapacitating rules based on the
nature of the parties or the subject matter. See, e.g., Meacham v. Jamestown. Franklin
& Clearfield R.R., 211 N.Y. 346, 105 N.E. 653 (1914).
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expectations is relatively stronger in the multistate situation, and a ju-
risdiction might be inclined to validate multistate transactions more
readily than purely domestic ones. A policy of validation is especially
appropriate where the jurisdiction that has an invalidating rule was
not reasonably connected to the transaction at the time of its execu-
tion.73 Thus, the strength of the policy varies depending on the fore-
seeability at the time of the transaction of a connection with a specific
jurisdiction.
Another factor which affects the strength of the policy of validating
multistate transactions is the nature and purpose of the domestic rule.
Some invalidating rules are designed to protect individual parties and
do justice in individual cases. For example, the invalidity of oral
promises to make testamentary gifts under a Statute of Frauds pro-
tects individual estates against fraudulent claims which the decedent
cannot refute. Although this may frustrate valid claims, the justifica-
tion is that however attractive the claim seems, experience teaches us
that invalidating such claims does justice in the majority of cases.
Thus, in this area, the Statute of Frauds is our best guess at justice in
the individual case.
In contrast, some invalidating rules are designed to sacrifice justice
in individual cases to further a more general social benefit. For exam-
ple, a Statute of Frauds that requires written contracts between living
persons encourages written evidence that either prevents misunder-
standing or makes litigation easier for a court to handle if it occurs.
Similarly, an invalidating rule like the Rule Against Perpetuities is de-
signed to prevent commerce from becoming clogged with inalienable
property. Even if justice in an individual case would be promoted by
ignoring the invalidating rule, the court will nevertheless apply it to
give credibility to the command and thereby secure the future social
benefit.7 4
73. For example, it seems particularly harsh to invalidate a will under the law of
the testator's domicile at death when the decedent did not move to that jurisdiction
until after the will was executed, see Bernkrant v. Fowler, 55 Cal. 2d 588, 360 P.2d
906, 12 Cal. Rptr. 266 (1961), or, similarly, to invalidate a chattel mortgage on an
automobile, valid where executed, because it is invalid under the law of a state to
which the car was unforeseeably driven, see People v. One 1953 Ford Victoria, 48
Cal. 2d 595, 311 P.2d 480 (1957). This is true even though the decedent's domicile at
death or the situs of a chattel are very important connections for choice of law in each
respective area.
74. Invalidating rules need not be purely of one type. For example, the invalidity of
oral.promises to make testamentary gifts facilitates the judicial process and a "two
witness rule" reduces the chance of an incorrect result in an individual case. Similarly,
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When an invalidating rule is primarily designed to do justice in in-
dividual cases, there is no special reason to prefer validation through
choice of law principles; the very purpose of the domestic rule sug-
gests that an injustice is likely to occur if the transaction is upheld. On
the other hand, when an invalidating rule is designed to secure a gen-
eral social benefit, a special case for validation can be made on the
theory that the social goal of the invalidating rule is substantially ef-
fectuated if nearly all transactions conform to its terms. For instance,
commerce will remain unclogged if nearly all property is unfettered,
and courts can remain unclogged if nearly all litigation is based on
written rather than oral evidence. The detriment to the general social
goal will be even less when the domestic rules of the competing juris-
dictions differ only in detail, such as the length of time specified by
the Rule Against Perpetuities.75 Thus, there can be exceptions to en-
forcement, especially when they are sufficiently distinguishable that
they do not undermine the credibility of the command to the domestic
population. 76
This argument in favor of selective validation enhances the earlier
argument concerning the special weight of party expectations in the
multistate situation. It is more justifiable to sacrifice parties to further
a general social benefit, if it is clear that the parties were or should
have been on notice at the time of their transaction that it would fall
under the invalidating rule. It is less justifiable to make an example of
parties when it becomes unclear whether they could have anticipated
that the law of the invalidating jurisdiction would be applied to their
transaction.
The strongest argument for validation occurs in cases where the
invalidating rule furthers a general societal benefit but is mandated by
a jurisdiction that did not become connected with the transaction until
usury rules seek both to protect individual debtors and to regulate the price of credit
by preventing creditors from bidding it up. The point is that different invalidating
rules have different emphases.
75. Cf., e.g., Kinney Loan & Fin. Co. v. Sumner. 159 Neb. 57. 65 N.W.2d 240
(1954) (usury); Shannon v. Irving Trust Co., 257 N.Y. 95, 9 N.E.2d 792 (1937)
(Rule Against Perpetuities).
In addition to supporting this rationale for validation, the fact that two jurisdictions'
rules effect similar policies but differ in detail is an independent reason for validation.
Even where an invalidating rule is designed to do justice in individual cases, justice
will not necessarily be frustrated by applying a similar rule that differs in detail only.
76. This is similar to exempting an ambassador from altering his smog control
device if the car complies with foreign law, but not exempting him from stopping at
red lights.
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after its execution. 77 Conversely, the weakest case for validation oc-
curs where the invalidating rule seeks justice in individual cases and is
mandated by a jurisdiction with a close connection to the transaction
from the beginning. Cases are more difficult where pro-validation and
anti-validation arguments collide.
Further complexity arises from the fact that within substantive
areas, policies change from issue to issue. For example, whereas the
Statute of Frauds reflects policies that are of greatest concern to the
decedent's domicile, the Rule Against Perpetuities reflects policies of
greatest concern to the situs of the decedent's property. Coupled with
the crosscutting rationales for validation, this creates a complex situa-
tion refusing adequate treatment by a single rule. While a sufficiently
complex rule system could anticipate most situations, its complexity
would defeat many of the benefits of having an easily applicable rule.
Thus, the imposition of a single rule or simple rule system on this area
of choice of law might result in serious mapping problems, with the
rules creating more harm than good.
The New York host-guest cases and the cases involving the valida-
tion of multistate transactions exemplify the dilemma of choosing
between formal and nonformal choice of law methodologies. Neither
formalism nor nonformalism offers a panacea; each mitigates prob-
lems of the other only to add problems of its own. The host-guest and
validation examples suggest an irreconcilable tension between formal
and nonformal approaches, at least at the practical level.7 8 Although
we can search for solutions, even mixtures,7 9 that maximize benefits or
minimize detriments in specific areas, we should recognize the ever-
present drawbacks of each approach and abandon a search for meth-
odologies that are ideologically pure. Moreover, even the treatment
given here of the host-guest and validation problems suggests that dif-
ferent levels of formality are appropriate for different areas of law.
The New York host-guest cases suggest caution before hasty adop-
tion of nonformal methods like interest analysis. One can be easily
deceived into believing that more information is always better, that
77. E.g., People v. One 1953 Ford Victoria, 48 Cal. 2d 595, 311 P.2d 480 (1957).
The situation is even more complex because a third variable-whether the competing
rules differ only in detail-also varies independently.
78. Whether the tension is irreconcilable at the theoretical level is beyond the scope
of the present discussion. Compare H. Hart & A. Sachs, supra note 11, with Kennedy,
supra note 8. See generally R. UNGER, supra note 15.
79. See note 11 supra.
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justice should be pursued in each case, and that a rule should never be
applied when doing so would frustrate its own purpose. If nothing
else, the New York experience suggests caution in the acceptance of
these notions. The counterweight of the validation cases and the com-
plexity and tension in choosing between formalism and nonformalism
have a broader message. Choices among choice of law methodologies
should be made with an awareness of the complexity of the choice
rather than with an a priori commitment to the rhetoric and ideology
of either formalism or nonformalism.
III. CONCEPTUALISM AND INSTRUMENTALISM
The foregoing analysis of formalism has focused on the pressures
which mapping problems exert on the application of formal rules. As
noted in Part I, however, formal rules also exhibit a freezing problem,
in that they reflect policies of one era that become out of tune with
conditions of a new era. An analysis of this aspect of formalism facili-
tates insight into contemporary developments in choice of law metho-
dology and helps overcome the myopia inherent in dealing with a cur-
rent phenomenon.
Although the lex loci rules championed by Professor Beale and the
first Restatement can be analyzed as formally pursuing the goal of se-
lecting the jurisdiction with the most significant interest in regulating a
transaction,8 0 historically they were justified through the concep-
tualism of the vested rights theory.81 Like many of his predecessors, 82
Professor Beale developed a conceptual theory explaining why one
sovereign defers to the law of another and defining the power of sover-
eigns and the legal obligations of individuals in multistate situations.
His vested rights theory held that if a right or obligation was created,
it followed the person and could be enforced everywhere. Because the
forum enforced a preexisting right, it applied the law of the place
80. See note 29 and accompanying text supra.
81. See Slater v. Mexican Nat'l R.R., 194 U.S. 120, 126 (1904) (Holmes. J.); J.
BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1935); A. DICEY, A DIGEST OF THE LAW OF ENGLAND WITH
REFERENCE TO THE CONFLICT OF LAWS xliii (1896); RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS (1934); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS ch. 7, Explanatory Note
I at 412-13 (1971).
82. See, e.g., S. LIVERMORE, DISSERTATIONS ON THE QUESTIONS WHICH ARISE FROM
THE CONTRARIETY OF THE POSITIVE LAWS OF DIFFERENT STATES AND NATIONS (1828);
J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1834). See also W. COOK, THE
LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1942).
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where the right was created to determine its existence and scope. It
was from these principles that the lex loci rules were derived. A right
was created when and where the last act occurred that gave rise to
liability, which for torts was the injury and for contracts was the last
act forming a contract or the act constituting a breach. As concep-
tualism gave way to instrumentalism (i.e., the notion that law should
advance social policies rather than merely flow from a conceptual
construct), 83 the rationale of the lex loci rules was no longer accepted
by judges called on to apply them. A freezing problem existed because
a rule system reflecting a bygone intellectual paradigm remained
static while the underlying outlook of the legal community was chang-
ing. 84
In such cases the pressure of stare decisis reflecting formal values85
initially supports the bygone rule system. When new values shift suffi-
ciently, however, results mandated by the old rule system become in-
creasingly intolerable. Thus, old rules tend to crack under the increas-
ing pressure of the freezing phenomenon and give way to a new order. 86
The new order might be either a new set of rules, as formal as the old
rules but with a new content reflecting prevailing values, or an era of
nonformalism with direct appeal to the new values. In the latter case
it may be expected that rules generally, rather than merely the specific
rules of the old order, will come under attack in conjunction with an
appeal to the values of nonformalism.
The recent break with the old order in choice of law has taken the
latter course, which is not atypical of the judicial process generally. 87
Although it is difficult to explain precisely why this course has been
taken, two suggestions can be made. First, a methodological shift
from formalism to nonformalism rather than a direct substantive shift
from one rule system to another gives the judicial process the appear-
83. Instrumentalism is used in this discussion merely to refer to the idea that rules
or decisions should reflect social policy rather than be derived solely from a logical,
conceptual system. Instrumentalism is not, as it might be, used to refer to a theory in
which rules are followed only if doing so would advance their social policy bases. See
generally Horwitz, The Emergence of an Instrumental Conception of American Law,
1780-1820, in 5 PERSPECTIVES IN AMERICAN HISTORY 287 (1971).
84. If the lex loci rules were purely logical derivatives from the vested rights the-
ory they would not, of course, commit mapping errors vis-a-vis vested rights. The
concept of mapping errors applies only to formal rules and not to logical entailments.
85. Stare decisis is the archetypical legal formality, because it directs judges to dis-
regard solutions except as embodied in precedents.
86. See generally Horwitz, supra note 83; Kennedy, supra note 8.
87. See notes 93-100 and accompanying text infra.
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ance of propriety. A direct shift from one rule system to another must
be justified in terms of changing values. While legal realists have
shown that an appeal to value is often unavoidable, 88 judges are more
comfortable appealing to a harmonization of values as defined by leg-
islators and precedents than they are defining new values themselves.
A methodological shift from formalism to nonformalism need not ex-
plicitly rely on changing values because it can be justified in the juris-
prudential terms of the mapping problem. New results can then be
justified with direct reference to new values without mention of the
fact that these values differ from those which generated the rules of a
bygone era. Even if reference is made to a shift in values, a methodo-
logical change can be justified at least partially with reference to meth-
odological concerns, softening the appearance of judicial legislation.
By focusing on the mapping problem and the level of formality, a
court can divert attention from a possibly controversial value shift, or
make the shift appear less abrupt and arbitrary. Second, while it is
easy to determine that old rules grate on sensibilities created by new
values, it is difficult to develop immediately a formal rule system that
translates new values into results. A new formal order cannot intelli-
gently be created until the new value paradigm, hidden by the old
formal system and therefore not openly discussed and debated, is fully
understood. An understanding of policies behind rules and reasoned
distinctions between cases, as well as experience with predictability
and the quantity of litigation, is required before common law rule-
makers become sufficiently proficient with the new values to promul-
gate new formal rules.89 Immediately adopted new formal rules may
be mistaken, and they would screen factors and cut off debate about
the new values which judges seek to understand. 90
Because it is difficult to design a new order immediately from the
perspective of an old order or its ashes, 91 it is reasonable to develop
the new order slowly in an era of flexible nonformalism. In such an
era, the costs of nonformalism could be justified not only as avoiding
88. See Holmes, supra note 12, at 464-68.
89. See, e.g., Reese, Choice of Law: Riles or Approach. 57 CORNELL L. REV. 315,
321-24 (1972); R. UNGER, supra note 15, at 236-59.
90. Although the new rules could continue to be altered until they reflect the
new value paradigm, overly frequent changes make the judicial process appear arbi-
trary and undermine many of the formal values supporting rules as rules. Moreover.
even with frequent rule changes, the policy discussion inherent in nonformalism and
necessary to promulgate informed rules would be curtailed.
91. See R. UNGER, supra note 15, at 236-59.
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the costs of formalism within the era but also as informing the pro-
mulgation of new formal rules. Thus, the period of nonformalism will
pay dividends for the entire life of a new formal order.
This process occurred in the New York host-guest cases. It was
possible to make a decision in Babcock that lex loci delictus should be
abandoned, but insufficient information and experience existed to
develop a new formal rule. As more cases were decided, however,
greater understanding developed concerning the policies and values at
stake in host-guest situations. After experience with the new value sys-
tem, which would have been hidden by an immediate promulgation of
new rules in Babcock, the court in Neumeier was in a better position
to promulgate a rule that would withstand the test of time. Thus, the
process involved (1) a rejection of an old rule system in favor of both
nonformalism and a new set of underlying instrumental values, (2) an
era of nonformalism where the new values became understood, and
(3) a crystallization of new formal rules reflecting the new value
system.92
The model of judicial change exhibited by the New York host-guest
cases is not atypical of judicial paradigmatic shifts. For example,
flourishing nonformal instrumentalism in the early 19th century fits a
similar model. Notwithstanding the formal values of stare decisis, ap-
plication of 18th-century protective notions of property inflicted in-
creasing costs on economic development. 93 Thus, the old rules
cracked and gave way to a new order of pro-developmental decisions,
such as the reasonable use doctrine in riparian rights94 and negligence
in torts.95 The new standards were nonformal, thereby inviting an
inquiry into reasonableness in each case. Formal rules could have
been developed at the outset to define reasonableness, but it is unlikely
92. The rules need not crystallize in one step. Nonformalism can give way to guide-
lines which in turn can be replaced by presumptions before the court is confident
enough to announce formal rules. See Reese, supra note 89, at 323. The "unless"
clause in rule (3) in Nettneier can be viewed as a response to these consideration.
Neumeier v. Keuhner, 31 N.Y.2d 121, 128, 286 N.E.2d 454, 458, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64,
70 (1972).
93. See generally Horwitz, supra note 83. Although monopolistic, vested rights
property rules might have been required to attract high risk capital from first entrants,
such rules frustrated second entrants equipped with better technology.
94. See, e.g., Tyler v Wilkinson, 24 F. Cas. 472 (No. 14,312) (C.C.D.R.I. 1827);
Pitts v. Lancaster Mills, 13 Met. 156 (Mass. 1847); Platt v. Johnson, 15 Johns. 213
(N.Y. 1818) (semble); Palmer v. Mulligan, 3 Caines 308, 312 (N.Y. 1805) (Living-
ston, J.); Lauer, Reflections on Riparianisin, 35 Mo. L. REv. 1, 7-11 (1970).
95. See, e.g., Brown v. Kendall, 6 Cush. 292 (Mass. 1850); Posner, A Theory of
Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972).
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that judges had sufficient understanding of or experience with the
embryonic economy to promulgate wise rules. Thus, the fact that the
frozen 18th-century rules were out of alignment with prevailing eco-
nomic conditions put pressure on them that led to their collapse and
the rise of a flexible, instrumental era of judicial reasoning.
Moreover, formal values did not strike a chord in the beginning of
the 19th century and therefore did not support stare decisis and the
application of the old rules in spite of their content. Predictability was
provided to a limited extent by a rising professional bar that could
predict (or control) without formal rulesf 6 Moreover, the control of
judges was unlikely to be perceived as a significant problem in an era
when values were shared, at least among those in power.97 With the
costs of formalism high and its benefits low, it is not surprising to find
that nonformal instrumentalism flourished in the early part of the
19th century. Nor is it surprising to find a return to formalism later in
the century when shared values collapsed following the Civil War and
legal doctrines, developed in an era of nonformalism, had become
aligned with the new economic order.98
Whatever its shortcomings due to generalization and simplification,
an historical view of this process can provide participants in the devel-
opment of choice of law methodology a perspective that mitigates
myopia. By revealing the contingency of formal and nonformal rheto-
rics upon changing social conditions, an historical perspective can
help judges resist the temptation of committing themselves to the ide-
ology of nonformalism as a determinant of methodology in perpetuity.
Different methodologies strike a chord at different stages of legal de-
velopment. 99 After a bygone order has been dismantled and sufficient
understanding of the new order is attained during a nonformal period,
judges should be prepared to explore cautiously a new formal system.
96. See P. MILLER, THE LIFE OF THE MIND IN AMERICA 99-134 (1965).
97. See 0. HANDLIN & M. HANDLIN, COMMONWEALTH: A STUDY OF THE ROLE OF
GOVERNMENT IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY: MASSACHUSETTS, 1774-1861, at 106-60
(1969). A similar sense of commonwealth did not exist on public law questions, and
the codification movement certainly evidences a lack of commonwealth among certain
groups.
98. See Nelson, The Impact of the Antislavery Movement u/pon Styles of Judicial
Reasoning in Nineteenth Century America, 87 HARV. L. REv. 513 (1974). Although
negligence persisted, pressure existed to formalize it. See 0. W. HOLMES. sttpra note 31.
at 89-90.
99. An historical perspective also mitigates the tendency of modernity to find old
approaches laughable and naive. It often turns out that they simply responded to dif-
ferent conditions.
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It would be appropriate for courts to consider this approach for
choice of law methodology, and in this respect, the New York host-
guest cases might be prophetic. 100
IV. WASHINGTON CHOICE OF LAW METHODOLOGY
Although Washington has clearly abandoned lex loci for both
contracts' 01 and torts 0 2 in favor of the "most significant contacts"
approach, the contours of the new approach are unclear. Specifically,
Washington has not clearly chosen among the various nonformal
methods discussed in Part I. Thus, Washington choice of law meth-
odology is at a sufficiently formative stage that the court has not yet
foreclosed the opportunity to select carefully a method based on the
considerations discussed above, including a return to carefully formu-
lated rules developed during a period of nonformality.
The Washington Supreme Court has considered four choice of law
cases involving contracts in which the "most significant contacts" ap-
proach has been applied. In Baffin Land Corp. v. Monticello Motor
Inn, Inc.,'0 3 a Delaware corporation contracted to rent television sets
to a hotel operated by a Washington resident and his wife. Subsequent-
ly, the hotel operators were divorced. The litigation involved the wife's
liability for this obligation of the hotel. The contract was negotiated
and signed by the lessee in Washington, but because it was later
signed by the lessor in New York, it was a "New York contract," and
lex loci contractus would have dictated the application of New York
law. The court abandoned lex loci contractus, claiming that it did not
always achieve its goal of simplicity and predictability on the one
hand and that it was not sufficiently flexible to handle the variety of
multistate transactions on the other. 04 The court then hinted at the
contours of its new method.
The court explicitly declined wholesale adoption of the Restate-
ment (Second), but it did "acknowledge [its] reliance on the work of
100. See Reese, supra note 89, at 318-24.
101. Baffin Land Corp. v. Monticello Motor Inn, Inc., 70 Wn. 2d 893, 425 P.2d
623 (1967).
102. Werner v. Werner, 84 Wn. 2d 360, 526 P.2d 370 (1974).
103. 70 Wn. 2d 893, 425 P.2d 623 (1967).
104. Id. at 897-99, 425 P.2d at 626-27. The court indicated that usurious contracts
might be exempt from its holding. Id. at 899, 425 P.2d at 627. The court had earlier
expressed an interest in replacing lex loci contractus in Pacific Fin. Corp. v. J. Ed Ray-
mer Co., 68 Wn. 2d 211, 214-15, 412 P.2d 120, 122-23 (1966) (dictum).
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the drafters of the Second Restatement as the basic stepping stone in
[its] attempt to arrive at a better contracts choice of law doctrine." 10 5
Absent more specific guidance, we must start with the proposition that
the new Washington method is roughly outlined in the Restatement
(Second), but its details are unclear. In terms of the analysis presented
in Part I, the court did not explicitly choose between "grouping of
contacts," in which a court does not take into account the content of
and policies behind each jurisdiction's rule, and interest analysis, in
which a court does make such an inquiry.
The court did indicate that "[t] he approach is not to count con-
tacts, but rather to consider which contacts are most significant and to
determine where those contacts are found." 106 At first glance, this
might be seen as an adoption of interest analysis. Contacts, however,
can vary in significance in ways other than those revealed by interest
analysis. Certain issues, such as ceremonial formalities of a contract,
might heighten the significance of the place of the contract's execution,
whereas other issues, such as execution against community property,
might enhance the significance of the parties' domicile. Therefore,
refusal merely to count contacts does not entail an adoption of interest
analysis.
Indeed, the court's application of the new method to the facts of
Baffin indicates that interest analysis was not used. The court identi-
fied the significant contacts, 10 7 assigned them to the respective con-
105. 70 Wn. 2d at 900, 425 P.2d at 627. In terms of nomenclature, the court equated
the "most significant relationship" theory with the "center of gravity" theory, using
the two expressions interchangeably. Id. at 896 n.l, 425 P.2d at 625 n. 1.
106. Id. at 900, 425 P.2d at 628 (emphasis in original).
107. The court noted the following formulation:
(1) In the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties consideration
will be given to the following factors, among others, in determining the state with
which the contract has its most significant relationship:
(a) the place of contracting,
(b) the place of negotiation of the contract,
(c) the place of performance,
(d) the situs of the subject matter of the contract,
(e) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of
business of the parties,
(f) the place under whose local law the contract will be most effective.
(2) If the place of contracting, the place of negotiating the contract and the
place of performance are in the same state, the local law of this state ordinarily
determines the validity of the contract, except in the case of usury....
Id. at 901, 425 P.2d at 628, quoting Weintraub, The Contracts Proposals ofthe Second
Restatement of Conflict of Laws-A Critique, 46 IOWA L. REV. 713, 723 (1961)
(quotation of November 1960 modification of § 322b tentative draft). This listing orig-
inated in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 322b, comment b (Tent.
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cerned jurisdictions, 10 8 and determined that certain of them were
more significant: 109
[T] he contacts . . . involving the places of contracting, negotiation,
and performance seem to be the most important in the present case,
with emphasis here on the place of performance since it was one of the
parties sole place of business, the place where the parties actually did
business together, and the place whose laws the parties most likely had
in mind in this type of a transaction.
The court concluded that Washington had the most significant con-
tacts and that its law should therefore govern the wife's contractual
liability. Nowhere in its choice of law analysis did the court refer to
the content of either jurisdiction's rule or the policies supporting it.
Only after choosing Washington law did the court relate its content,
and nowhere was the content of New York law discussed. 10
Pacific States Cut Stone Co. v. Goble,"' decided the same day as
Baffin, shed little additional light on the new method. Like Baffin, it in-
volved the issue of marital community liability for a contractual obli-
gation, in this instance a contract for the sale of a piece of machinery.
The seller was a Washington corporation and the purchasers and their
wives were Washington residents. Numerous contacts with Oregon
were present, however, and the court concluded that Oregon law con-
trolled:" 2
The contract was executed in Oregon, at least part of the negotiations
took place in Oregon, the seller completely performed in Oregon, and
Draft No. 6, 1960). For the present listing, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT
OF LAWS § 188 (1971).
108.
Since there was no express choice of law determined by the parties in the present
instance, we shall apply the above factors to the facts before us. The place of
contracting was in New York. The place of negotiation of the contract was at
least partially in Washington .... At least the major portion of the performance
of the contract was to, and did, take place in Washington. . . . If there can be
said to be a subject matter of the instant contract, it was the television sets which
were installed in Washington. [The lessee] was domiciled in and a resident of
Washington at the time of contracting, and [the lessor], a Delaware corporation,
was authorized to and was doing business in Washington.
70 Wn. 2d at 901-02, 425 P.2d at 628.
109. Id. at 902, 425 P.2d at 628.
110. It is difficult to draw firm conclusions from the court's explicit application of
its method in an individual case. The judges might have implicitly relied on factors
included in interest analysis.
111. 70 Wn. 2d 907, 425 P.2d 631(1967).
112. Id. at 909, 425 P.2d at 632.
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the situs of the subject matter of the contract at the time of contracting
as at the time of performance by the seller was in Oregon. Most signif-
icant is that the place of delivery of possession by the seller was in
Oregon. . . . We find, therefore, that application of the most signifi-
cant contacts rule produces the same result as that obtained by appli-
cation of the rule of lex loci contractus, which, as indicated above, is
no longer the law of this jurisdiction.
Again, nowhere in the choice of law process did the court identify the
content of Washington and Oregon law and examine the policies they
reflect. Only after deciding to apply Oregon law- did the court mention
its content. Like Baffin, Pacific States contains little indication that
the court is inclined to engage in interest analysis, notwithstanding the
comment in Baffin that the new method involves more than simply
counting contacts.
Potlatch No. 1 Federal Credit Union v. Kennedy, 113 however, of-
fers conflicting evidence. A promissory note between a Washington
borrower and an Idaho lender, secured by personal property in Wash-
ington and executed in Idaho, was cosigned by the borrower's brother,
a Washington resident. In a suit against the Washington cosigner, the
issue was whether his marital community was liable. Under Wash-
ington law the marital community would be liable for suretyship debts
only if the marital community was benefited by the obligation,
whereas under Idaho law the marital community would be obligated
notwithstanding lack of benefit.
The Potlatch opinion reiterated the langauge of Baffin that the new
method is not merely to count contacts, and then the court proceeded
to apply interest analysis and even elements of functional analysis.
Moreover, the court was explicit about its enterprise:1 14
113. 76 Wn. 2d 806, 459 P.2d 32(1969).
114. Id. at 810, 459 P.2d at 35. The court quoted at length from a comment in the
Restatement (Second) that clearly contemplates interest analysis:
c. Purpose of contract ride. The purpose sought to be achieved by the contract
rules of the potentially interested states, and the relation of these states to the
transaction and the parties, are important factors to be considered in determining
the state of most significant relationship. This is because the interest of a state in
having its contract rule applied in the determination of a particular issue will de-
pend upon the purpose sought to be achieved by that rule and upon the relation
of the state to the transaction and the parties. So the state where a party to the
contract is domiciled has an obvious interest in the application of its contract rule
designed to protect that party against the unfair use of superior bargaining power.
And a state where a contract provides that a given business practice is to be pur-
sued has an obvious interest in the application of its rule designed to regulate or
to deter that business practice. On the other hand, the purpose of a rule and the
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Certainly an identification of contacts is meaningless without con-
sideration of the interests and public policies of potentially concerned
states and a regard as to the manner and extent of such policies as they
relate to the transaction in issue. These competing policies must also
be weighed against the justified expectations of the parties.
After explicating its methodology, the court applied it to the facts
of Potlatch. Idaho's rule reflected a policy of protecting creditors and
"insuring the normalcy of business relations within its borders." 115
These policies were manifested because an Idaho creditor and an
Idaho business transaction were involved. On the other hand, Wash-
ington's rule reflected a policy of protecting spousal interests in com-
munity assets, which was manifested due to the presence of a Wash-
ington marital community.
Since Idaho and Washington each had a manifested interest in
having its own law applied, the court was required to resolve a true
conflict. Implicitly appealing to aspects of functional analysis, the
court analyzed the special multistate interest of deferring to party ex-
pectations. 116 The creditor might have expected access to the surety's
community assets under Idaho law and the surety's wife might have
expected protection under Washington law. Because the wife might
have been unaware of the transaction, whereas the creditor knew it
was dealing with a Washington surety, the court concluded that the
creditor had greater reason to anticipate the application of Wash-
ington law. Thus, although a true conflict between Washington and
Idaho interests existed, the Washington court was able rationally to
relation of a state to a transaction and the parties may indicate that the state has
little or no interest in the application of that rule in the particular case. So a state
may have little interest in the application of a rule designed to protect a party
against the unfair use of superior bargaining power if the contract is to be per-
formed in another state which is the domicile of the person seeking the rule's pro-
tection. And a state may have little interest in the application of a statute designed
to regulate or to deter a certain business practice if the conduct complained of is
to take place in another state.
Whether an invalidating rule should be applied will depend, among other things,
upon whether the interest of the state in having its rule applied to strike down the
contract outweighs in the particular case the value of protecting the justified ex-
pectations of the parties and upon whether some other state has a greater interest
in the application of its own rule.
Id. at 810-11, 425 P.2d at 35, quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
§ 188, comment c (1971).
115. 76 Wn. 2d at 811,459 P.2d at 36.
116. Id. at 812-13, 459 P.2d at 36-37. The court discussed the parties' expectations
without expressly indicating the special importance of this issue in multistate trans-
actions.
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choose Washington law by referring to the special multistate concern
for party expectations.
Unlike Baffin and Pacific States, Potlatch supports a conclusion
that Washington choice of law methodology involves interest analysis
and possibly even elements of functional analysis. Potlatch also con-
siders a crucial issue not addressed in Baffin and Pacific States: the
criteria by which a true conflict is to be resolved. Potlatch refers to
rational distinctions between the parties' expectations; Baffin and Pa-
cific States simply opt for certain combinations of interests over
others.
It would be a mistake, however, to infer too much from the meth-
odology of Potlatch. Even though the court was self-conscious about its
reference to the content of and policies behind Idaho and Washington
law, there was no recognition of the fact that this method differs from
the one employed in Baffin and Pacific States. While some weight can
be given to the fact that Potlatch is a more recent case, the failure of
the court to perceive consciously the difference between the Baffin-
Pacific States approach and the Potlatch approach raises the possi-
bility that the court will inadvertently oscillate between the two.
Moreover, in its two most recent choice of law cases, Werner v.
Werner1 17 and Granite Equipment Leasing Corp. v. Hutton,118 the
court returned to the Baffin-Pacific States version of the most signifi-
cant contacts method without referring to the difference between it
and the Potlatch version.
Werner is of special interest, because it is the most recent applica-
tion of the "most significant contacts" approach in Washington, and
because it specifically applies that approach to torts. The substantive
issue in Werner was whether California notaries were liable in tort for
affixing their imprimatur to a forged signature on a document con-
veying immovables in Washington. The court cited both Baffin and
Potlatch as authority for the "most significant contacts" approach
without distinguishing between their methodologies, 19 and it pro-
117. 84 Wn. 2d 360, 526 P.2d 370 (1974).
118. 84 Wn.2d 320, 525 P.2d 223 (1974). The choice of law analysis in Granite
Equipment is dictum because the failure of either party to plead foreign law raised a
presumption that it was identical to the law of Washington. See WASH. REV. CODE §
5.24.040 (1974).
The Washington Court of Appeals has followed the Baffin-Pacific States methodology
in which the content and policies of each jurisdiction's rule are ignored. See Warner v.
Kressly, 9 Wn. App. 348, 512 P.2d 1116 (1973).
119. 84Wn. 2d at 368, 526 P.2d at 376.
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ceeded to enumerate contacts without looking to the content of or
policy behind the respective Washington and California rules: 120
We must consider the significant contacts of this cause with the states
of Washington and California. The plaintiff purchasers are presum-
ably here, as well as, the real estate agent. . . and, of course, the sub-
ject parcel. In California, however, reside the notaries, their em-
ployers and sureties, and probably the forgers. Most importantly, the
notaries are public officers of the State of California. Thus, their du-
ties as notaries and potential liabilities must be defined according to
California law.
Thus, the Washington Supreme Court has adopted the "most signifi-
cant contacts" approach for both contracts and torts without giving a
clear indication of its contours. The seemingly unconscious divergence
of the Potlatch methodology from the Baffin-Pacific States-Werner
methodology suggests that the court has not consciously chosen the
contours of the method. It seems clear from Potlatch that the court
understands and is prepared to use interest analysis and even elements
of functional analysis, but precisely when it will do so and whether it
fully recognizes the distinctions among the various methodologies is
unclear.
Whatever the contours of the method, the court should at least
clearly explicate them. Even a nonformal methodology should iden-
tify its own contours. If a court is free to choose its methodology on a
case-by-case basis, litigants cannot identify relevant information. For
example, if the court continues to use the Baffin-Werner methodology,
litigants need merely gather and prove facts about contacts. If the
court uses the Potlatch interest analysis approach, however, the par-
ties need to identify policies behind each jurisdiction's law and dis-
cover evidence necessary to determine if those policies come into
play. 121 Given the confusion over the methodology, a litigant or trial
120. Id. at 368, 526 P.2d at 376. Notwithstanding its protestations to the contrary
in Baffin, the court evidenced more allegiance to the Restatement (Second) than to the
"most significant contact" methodology in its nonformal form. In dictum, the court in-
dicated that the situs of immovables governs questions of their title, citing RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 222 (1971). 84 Wn. 2d at 367, 526 P.2d at
376.
121. In the host-guest situation, interest analysis, unlike the Baffin methodology,
would require the parties to introduce evidence concerning the existence of an injured
third party to determine whether the policy of protecting the recovery fund is mani-
fested.
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judge would find it difficult to determine whether such evidence is
material.
Beyond clearly defining its method, the Washington Supreme Court
should adopt and reiterate the Potlatch interest analysis approach.
The Baffin grouping of contacts approach contains nearly all, if not
more,' 22 of the uncertainties and manipulability of interest analysis
without benefitting from a consideration of the policies behind each
jurisdiction's rule. Because the court has abandoned rules, interest anal-
ysis or even functional analysis is likely to better reconcile the com-
peting values of formalism and nonformalism. Grouping of contacts is
likely to have most of the difficulties of nonformalism without reaping
many of its benefits. 123
Moreover, if the court is sensitive to the analysis in Part III, it
should consider a return to new, better rules when it becomes possible
to crystallize them from the new methodology. In the long run, a non-
formal choice of law methodology can lead to a quagmire similar to
that experienced in the New York host-guest cases. Thus, a return to
rules that are more complex than lex loci and that reflect instrumental
rather than conceptual values should be considered. Decisions in an
interim nonformal era can inform a judgment concerning a return to
rules, however, only if policies and governmental interests are dis-
cussed. Such a discussion can be developed in judicial decisions only
if the Potlatch interest analysis methodology, including its elements of
functional analysis, is adopted. It should be adopted, however, with
an eye toward crystallizing new and better choice of law rules to re-
capture the benefits of formalism. In this way, a transition between lex
loci and a new choice of law paradigm can be effected consciously
and rationally.
V. CONCLUSION
The Washington Supreme Court has responded to the Zeitgeist and
has abandoned lex loci contractus and lex loci delictus. It should now
carefully and explicitly consider the method that will replace them,
and in doing so, it should not permit the value of rules to pale in the
rhetoric of nonformalism. By rejecting the old rule system, the court
122. See note 33 supra.
123. "Most." because even if grouping of contacts is as unpredictable as interest
analysis. it requires less information to apply.
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need not become committed to a rejection of all rule systems. If the
"significant contacts" method is used properly to include an inquiry
into policies and governmental interests behind the rules of com-
peting jurisdictions, it can help precipitate new rules in the future. 124
If the Washington court considers the ways in which rules operate
and their value as well as their problems, it should be better able to
fashion a workable and sensible choice of law methodology. At the
very least, it should explicate its method and not oscillate between
competing methods without thought to their consequences.
124. A preference for rule-oriented choice of law methodology does not entail a
preference for a rule-oriented social structure. See note 26 supra.
